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COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
causes of opposition to war are so various, the state of
public opinion, locally and nationally, on the subject is
so fluctuating that an average person cannot be ex-
pected to visualize the circumstances that will surround
future wars. Then why exclude only very cautious in-
dividuals with New England consciences?
AN OATH seems to be'an unsatisfactory means of
testing the likelihood of good citizenship. It has broken
down as a means of obtaining truth from a witness.
If an oath is needed in naturalization proceedings for
some formal purpose, why not make it as colorless as
:)anrt III
By Ernst Freund
Professor of Law
University of Chicago
IWO collateral questions are suggested by the fore-
going two comments upon the decision in the Macin-
tosh case as well as by the decision itsel.f: First: If
the law requires, as a condition precedent to admission
either to citizenship or to any other position of public
trust, the taking of a prescribed form of oath, is it the
presumable intent of the legislature that there shall or
may be an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the oath?
By the common law of evidence it is legitimate to as-
certain whether the sanctions of the oath are operative
in point of conscience, but the power of inquiry stops
at that point. The terms of the oath prescribed by
the Naturalization Act are admittedly vague and fall
short of any standard ot legal precision. The even-
tuality of a defense of the Constitution and laws of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and do-
mestic, is as remote as the bearing of true faith and
allegiance to the same is subjective and undefinable.
Phrases such as these may be appropriate to a solemn
utterance meant to impress moral sense and conscience,
but defy minute and logical analysis. The statute in
the fourth paragraph of section 4, where it prescribes,
not the terms of the oath, but the evidence to be pre-
sented for admission, uses words of entirely different
import and character; and by laying down the test of
behavior in connection with the criterion of attachment
to the Constitution, divests even that criterion of the
ambiguity which it might have if used merely as de-
scriptive of a state of mind. On legal principles, the
statute would appear to be satisfied by the willingness
to take the required oath; the difficulty is that the
appeal to sentiment or emotion which the oath involves
injects itself into the interpretation of the statute, and
has extended the scope of the examination until it be-
possible and then resort to other means to ascertain the
essential facts concerning the applicant? We need a
more objective method of testing. 'Section 4 of the
Naturalization Act provides for ascertainment of the
facts about a person. Probably it should be amplified.
Search the man's record and ascertain how he has lived,
abroad as well as in this country. If all of this is done
now under departmental regulations, then nothing more
can be done except to perfect the technique and so far
as possible choose the best who offer themselves. Why
strain at an oath which will result only in eliminating
some of our best prospects?
comes a searching inquiry into the conscience of the
applicant.
SECOND: It is of course conceded that the first
point made has no support in any of the opinions filed
in either the Schwimmer or the Macintosh cases; not
only that, but all the courts that have dealt with the
statute have ignored the plain fact that the statutory
criterion is not attachment to the Constitution but be-
havior for a period of five years as a person attached
to the Constitution. What we get from the wider and,
it is believed, unwarranted construction placed upon
the law, is a marked ,division of judicial opinion with
the usual result that there is .no general acquiescence in
the final decision by a bare majority.
Whatever may be thought of the right or wrong of
the decision, the law as interpreted leaves the quali-
fications for admission to citizenship in an undesirable
state of uncertainty. True, naturalization is a privi-I
lege, but Congress never intended to make it a matter
of judicial discretion. Such a criterion as attachment
to the Constitution, if the behavior test is abandoned,
is hopelessly uncertain. An instrument which invites
amendment can demand attachment only in a qualified
sense; and a close analysis of attachment leads to con-
tradictory results when we remember that the federal
and state constitutions proclaim diametrically opposite
principles of administrative organization.
IF CONGRESS intended 'the naturalization law to
mean what the courts have interpreted it to mean, the
tests of admission to citizenship may vary with the
political bias of the courts that administer it. It would
then be more logical to adopt the English plan accord-
ing to which the naturalization of an alien would lie
in the absolute discretion of the Secretary of State. If
the legislative policy is one of objective tests, the stat-
ute should be given a corresponding phrasing and con-
struction.
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